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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Test Ban Talks

In reaction to the Eisenhower statement of 29 Mai for unilateral pledges not to test small underground nuclear weapons, the USSR will probably insist that a moratorium on such tests be included in some form in a treaty banning all other tests. Moscow would seek to portray Western agreement to this arrangement as implying acceptance of the long-standing Soviet demand for a comprehensive ban on all tests.

Soviet chief delegate
Tsarapkin at Geneva has asked
why the United States favors
such unilateral declarations
rather than formal incorporation of a moratorium obligation
in the treaty, emphasizing that

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the USSR regards this question as of "crucial importance."

In requesting more details on the Eisenhower plan, Tsarapkin t h that the duration of a moratorium should coincide with that of the research and development program to make all tests detectable. Referring to an alleged statement by AEC Chairman McCone that four or five years would be necessary to develop a reliable control system over the cessation of all tests, Tsarapkin asked whether this is still the position of the United States.

The has been instructed to follow the United States' lead, but to agree, if pressed by the USSR, to the inclusion of the moratorium on underground tests below a certain threshold in the treaty banning tests above this threshold.

Disarmament Talks

The Soviet delegation at the disarmament talks continued to insist last week that the conference recognize the principle of "complete and general disarmament" and proceed to work out basic principles toward this objective. Follow-

ing Khrushchev's strong criticism in France of the failure of the Western plan to offer common areas for agreement, Zorin characterized the Western plan as an inadequate response to the UN resolution and unacceptable as a basis for further negotiations. He stressed the standard theme that the West was seeking to negotiate "complete and general control," while evading specific disarmament measures, and urged that the conference revert to the main task of complete and general disarmament assigned to it by the UN.

Despite continued bloc criticism of the Western plan, the atmosphere of the conference continued to be relaxed and the tone of the debate moderate.

Zorin stated publicly that he will not agree to discuss partial disarmament measures until it becomes clear that the West is not interested in general and complete disarmament. This line provides further evidence that Soviet tactics are aimed at drawing the West toward at least agreement in principle to Moscow's formula of "general and complete disarmament" as the goal of the conference or, failing this, to place the blame on the West for a failure to agree.

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